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The Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions  
Constitutions take various forms in different societies, but essentially determine how policy
issues, often of fundamental social importance, are to be decided and implemented.
Constitutions and constitutionalism are usually studied either doctrinally, as the source of
fundamental legal doctrine, or conceptually, as the subject of philosophical methods of
analysis. The approach of this programme offers a third way: the study of constitutions and
constitutionalism in their social context, emphasizing their social character and role, their
social goals, and their links to other parts of society, especially economic and political
aspects. 
Drawing on the research and literature of politics, economics, and sociology, the
programme examines the concept and practice of representation, the legislative process
and the character of modern administrative government, and the role of the judiciary in
shaping constitutional instruments such as bills of rights.
n In April the Turkish public will be asked to vote on the most ambitious changes to the
existing Turkish constitution since it became law in 1982, in a referendum that will take
place under the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the failed military
coup of 15 July 2016. There is no general consensus for this change and the outcome of
the referendum remains uncertain. If passed, the referendum will allow the president to
dissolve the parliament and declare a state of emergency.
n This policy brief outlines the passing of a consensual approach to constitution-making,
and views the changes as part of a process of partisan entrenchment, under which the
dominant AK party has gradually gained control of state institutions in Turkey. 
n The amendments are being made in accordance with constitutional rules; the fear of
some experts however, is that, if passed, the proposed presidential system will take
Turkey beyond constitutionalism altogether. 
n Another issue is whether the polarized and violent conditions that now exist in the
country will allow for a free and fair vote on the changes. The policy brief places the
dynamics of the complex constitutional amendment in the context of a polarized party
system and discusses:
• The failure of the consensus approach in Turkey.
• President Erdoğan’s desire to codify the executive power he already exercises.
• The divergent attitudes of the political parties to the current proposals.
• Fears that the changes will create a presidential system without effective checks
and balances.
• The origins of what may be a system of pure majoritarian rule in Turkey.
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On 16 April 2017 the Turkish public will vote on an
eighteen-article amendment to the Turkish
constitution that will establish a presidential system.
The referendum will take place under the state of
emergency declared in the aftermath of the failed
military coup of 15 July 2016. The current president,
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had stated that this will offer
‘a comfortable ground’ for the vote.1 Two weeks later,
in early February 2017, Dr Ibrahim Kaboğlu, Professor
of Constitutional Law at Marmara University Istanbul,
became one of 330 academics dismissed from their
posts as part of the latest post-coup investigations.2
He had publicly stated that a referendum held during
a state of emergency could not be constitutional. If
passed, the referendum will allow the president to
rule by decree and to declare further states of
emergency. Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu, leader of the
opposition CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or
Republican People’s Party), says that the outcome will
be ‘a totalitarian Presidential system’.3 The
atmosphere has moved far from that in October
2011, when an all-party Conciliation Commission
began work on drafting a new constitution. This
proved a false dawn: when the Commission was
dissolved in December 2013, few predicted the chain
of events that was to follow.
From consensus to partisan entrenchment  
What is the best way to enact constitutional change
and reform an authoritarian constitution? A natural
response is to assume a connection between the
way a constitution is drafted and its chances of
success. An array of constitutional experts once saw
an opportunity for the parties to craft a consensus in
a country where a spontaneous consensus was in
short supply. When he was prime minister, President
Erdoğan himself spoke of societal consensus and
advanced democracy. The Turkish experiment with
constitutional government had been punctuated by
instability and polarization. In the past, the state
found itself having to intervene to maintain order
and impose new rules of the game. The prospect of
elected politicians doing so consensually might
show that such tutelage is no longer necessary. The
pattern had also been for state elites to play a
disproportionate role in constitution-making, with
the result that the 1924, 1961, and 1982
constitutions were not the work of a broadly
representative Constituent Assembly.4 Recently, the
courts and the government-controlled parliament
have struggled for the right to determine
constitutional change. The courts consistently ruled
that any changes to the foundational rules of the
polity could not emerge through normal legal
procedures; President Erdoğan’s AKP (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi or Justice and Development Party)
was force to rely on its electoral strength to create
the possibility for constitutional change. The party
won parliamentary elections in 2002, 2007, and
2015. Only in June 2015 did it lose its parliamentary
majority; the transition to a presidential system
began in earnest after a snap general election, held
in November 2015, restored its majority position.
Constitutional politics once seemed open to a less
zero-sum approach. In the early 1990s a consensus
emerged that the existing 1982 constitution should
be replaced by a more democratic document. Passed
in the shadow of the 1980 military coup, this
constitution became associated with the tradition of
military tutelage and too centralized and nationalist
a state tradition. The need was for a ‘civil
constitution’: the preferred method for drafting it
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became consensus-building. By 2011, agreement
had been established for a way forward: the result
was that each of the four parties on the Conciliation
Commission would have equal voting rights; they
would also have an absolute veto. Significantly, the
Kurdish BDP (Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi) was one of
these four parties. In 2009, a ‘Kurdish opening’ was
announced by then Prime Minister Erdoğan: it was
renewed once in 2012. Before starting its formal
work, the Commission had also decided to wait for
the input of civil society organizations (suggestions,
reports, and drafts). It began its own work in April
2012. Reportedly on first-name terms, relations on
the Commission were amiable enough. 
Yet few were surprised when the Commission was
dissolved in December 2013, having reached
agreement only on technical articles. There were
three reasons. The level of consensus required for
agreement (even before the parliament considered
any draft) was unrealistic. Second, there was no
acceptance on the part of the three nationalist
parties for change to foundational issues: they
resisted the Kurdish perspective on citizenship,
language, and nationality. Thirdly, there was an
atmosphere of mistrust concerning the intentions of
the governing AKP. Erdoğan, in power since 2003,
could (according to his own party rules) only serve as
prime minister for three terms, and some of the
party’s elites had made their desire for a presidential
system clear as early as 2005. The other parties were
opposed to this move. Erdoğan was elected
president in a direct vote in 2014. In the summer of
2015, the Kurdish peace process broke down in the
context of opposition from the pro-Kurdish HDP
(Halklarin Democrat Partisi, People’s Democrat Party)
to the plans for the presidential system. Since then,
the serious violence of the 1990s has returned. 
The truth is that the consensus approach did not
reflect a need felt by all sections of Turkish society to
repudiate the past in the wake of despotic rule, as in
South Africa in the 1990s; or of catastrophe, as in
West Germany in the 1940s. Instead,
‘democratization’ in Turkey has proceeded through
intense struggles within state institutions; struggles
which have intensified since the split between the
AKP and the Islamist Gulen movement in December
2013 and the failed coup of 15 July 2016.5 On the
other hand, these divisions have left their mark on
the constitutional order, as the balance of power
between the old Kemalist and military elites and the
new challengers decisively shifted. The amendments
to be put before the people on 16 April 2017 have
already passed the parliamentary stage, achieving
nine more votes on 20 January than the three-fifths
majority of 330 required by the constitution.
Following constitutional referendums held in 2007
and 2010, they represent the most ambitious
changes proposed in Turkey since the 1982
constitution.
Both the mode and content of the proposed
changes have thus come to reflect a process of
‘partisan entrenchment’, in which a party with a
guiding ideology (in this case political Islam)
gradually gained control of state institutions. One
can view these proposals through the concept of
path dependency. The introduction of popular
elections for the presidency in 2011, greater party
political control over the judiciary, and the move to a
presidential system are consistent with the pure
majoritarianism of the 1924 constitution.6
Institutions are generally given two main roles in the
comparative politics literature: ‘as contingent effects
of strategic interaction and as predictable bases for
democratic consolidation’.7 Two trends suggested
predictable change: the general resilience of
majoritarian institutions, even in countries which
change constitutions, and the fact that Turkish elites
(including most of those in opposition) have no
incentive to liberalize institutions which concentrate
power; whether the centralized and unitary state
structure, executive dominance of parliament,
leader-dominated political parties, or the
disproportional electoral system.8 Under the current
amendments, future elections to the parliament and
the presidency will take place concurrently; this will
either further the concentration of power under the
AKP or lead to a constitutional breakdown.
The opposition, faced with a simple fait accompli,
may have to acquiesce in the new presidential
system if (a) they recognize that more powerful
actors will defend the new rules, and (b) there are
insufficient resources to communicate an alternative
set of constitutional rules around which mutual
expectations could build.9 As the conditions for a
free and fair referendum recede, this second
condition seems especially pertinent to the coming
referendum. Since July, the government has been
suppressing not just the coup plotters but, more
broadly, ‘the Fetuhullahist Terror Organisation’ of
‘FETÖ’ (a name for the Gulen movement blamed for
the failed coup), the Kurdish movement, and
intellectuals and leftists generally. On 9 January
2017, fifty civil society organizations, including the
Turkish Bar Association, were denied the right to
protest the charter talks at the parliament by the
police. Only a small part of the parliamentary
debates on the constitution — which were
acrimonious — were aired through the official
parliamentary TV station.10 An emergency decree
passed on 9 February 2017 has also ruled that the
Supreme Election Board (YSK) will cease to monitor
private television channels during the referendum
campaign (ruled on 9 February): this means that the
YSK will not be able to punish private channels for
unequal or biased broadcasting of the yes and no
sides in the campaign. 
Constitutionalism without checks and
balances
With the collapse of the tutelary system, the
outstanding question was whether a new system of
constitutional checks and balances could be
established in its place. Turkey’s constitutional life
has been shaped by two conceptions of democracy.
One (Rousseauist) conception sees sovereignty
resting on the national will (milli irade), in effect the
elected majority. The other harbours distrust of
governing majorities, and seeks to constrain them
through a system of guardianship. Since
guardianship — by the army, the courts, or the
bureaucracy — is no longer possible, only a pure
majoritarian understanding of democracy survives.
Yet this understanding has real sociological content.
Even if the presidential system becomes a form of
personalized rule under Erdoğan, it will be
welcomed by those who identify the Turkish nation
as being religious, conservative, and nationalist.
Journalist Nuray Mert sees the proposed changes as
deriving from ‘the majority’s aspiration of power’.11
Those not part of this majority — secularists, leftists,
Alevis, and Kurds — could remain excluded from
power for a long time. 
When parliament is composed of many parties with
different ideologies and power is dispersed, checks
and balances are inherent in the legislative process.
In the absence of such ‘extra-constitutional’ checks
and balances, formal rules bear the burden of
preventing majoritarian democracy from eclipsing
constitutional government.12 Yet despite the
proposed shift from parliamentarism, such rules are
not intended in the proposed amendments. The
consensual model envisaged that they would
emerge inductively from a carefully managed
situation of strategic interaction without a dominant
player, as with the Conciliation Commission. This
interaction could also have produced a constitution
supported by all parties afterwards, thus furthering
general reconciliation. Since 2013, exactly the
opposite scenario has arisen. The main opposition
CHP is bitterly opposed to this ‘regime change’, and
given that the armed conflict with the Kurdish PKK is
also ongoing, the government denounces its
opposition as national ‘sabotage’. The HDP is in no
position to campaign freely. After seeing the
parliamentary immunity of their elected
representatives lifted, co-leaders Selahattin Demirtaş
and Figen Yüksedağ have been in prison since late
2016, alongside around ten other deputies.
The government in turn complains about
‘Erdoğanophobia’ in the European Union, and argues
that the changes are only intended to bring the 1982
constitution in line with how the country is actually
governed. Under the amendments, the president will
assume the powers of the prime minister and the
cabinet. He will be able to rule by decree and
appoint vice-presidents and officials who are not
necessarily elected to the parliament. The president
will be able to declare further states of emergency,
during which he can rule by decree. He will have the
power to dissolve the parliament and call elections.
The size and independence of the Supreme Board of
Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) will be drastically
reworked. The office of ‘Head of State’ will be written
into the constitution for the first time since Kenan
Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup, was referred to in
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that way in a provisional article of the 1982
constitution. Some predict that Erdoğan will be
enabled by these changes to remain president until
2029.
The period of ‘democratization’, which can be traced
to the late 1980s, has thus mutated into one of
autocratization. It has allowed the dismantling of the
tutelary system, only for a new combination of
elections and authoritarianism to force its way onto
the constitutional agenda. Such was the resistance
to change under the old system that a juridical
theory upheld by the Constitutional Court initially
denied constituent power to the parliamentary
majority, which then used its constant electoral
victories to impose its will on the secular elites. The
system that could result may be a local version of
what the Argentinian political scientist Guillermo
O’Donnell called ‘delegative democracy’: in which a
strong president uses his or her direct mandate to
rule in the name of the nation at the expense of
horizontal accountability and of the rule of law.13
Middle Eastern parallels also suggest themselves:
some Arab countries have also seen their
constitutional provisions for a ‘semi-presidency’
transformed in order to establish a personalized
dictatorship. Erdoğan claims he is simply making the
de facto the de jure reality. The main impetus for the
current changes in Turkey was the first election to
the presidency by means of popular vote in 2011.
This allowed Erdoğan and his predecessor Abdullah
Gül to accumulate more powers, to such an extent
that the ultra-nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Haraket
Partisi, National Movement Party) is backing the
current changes on the grounds that the
constitution needs to be amended to fit the new
reality. Without its support, the three-fifths threshold
for staging a referendum might not have been
passed. 
Importantly, article 101 of the current constitution
stipulates that the president be non-partisan. The
atmosphere of polarization is such that the
government feels under little pressure to explain
how the law’s stipulation that the president be
above party politics is compatible with Erdoğan’s
fierce public advocacy for changes that will make
him the sole source of authority in the country. Upon
taking office, the president is supposed to sever his
relations with his party and cease being a member of
the parliament. Erdoğan has derided such an
ornamental ‘flower pot’ role for himself in the future:
claiming that earlier presidents, such as Ahmet Sezer,
were, in fact, not neutral. In contrast, Erdoğan claims
he will bring both state and nation together in his
person, compared to the elitism of the past, when
those that dominated the state did not and could
not represent the nation.14 Constitutional populism
of a religious kind. 
Under the proposed changes to Article 101, the
president will remain leader of his party and his
tenure will not be automatically restricted to one
term. Erdoğan has not been chairman of the AKP
since 2014; in the event of victory in the referendum,
sources close to the presidency suggest that an
extraordinary Congress of the Party will be convened
to re-elect him to that role. On the other hand, the first
four articles of the 1982 constitution, which the MHP
considers red lines, will remain untouched. These
articles also express a strong nationalist conception of
the state. The MHP’s support for the changes is not
based on its belief in one-man rule. The Party has
agreed to become part of a nationalist-religious
alliance in the knowledge that, given the absence of
checks and balances, the new ruling majority will
never lose power under the new system.15 Its leader,
Devlet Bahçeli, announced that his party would be
saying yes to the survival of the system, to the
presidency not to a president, ‘to the continuity of the
Republic’, and to ‘the eternity of the State’.16
The uncertain future
If these amendments are approved by the voters,
attention will no doubt become fixed on the huge
opportunities they create for financial gain and the
distribution of patronage within the governing party.17
This will be ironic given CHP claims that President
Erdoğan is making these changes precisely in order to
protect himself and his family from prosecution. For
others, at stake is the future of democracy. Former
President of Turkey’s Supreme Court of Appeals Sami
Selçuk argued that what determines whether a
presidential system is oppressive or not is the existence
of a separation of powers. He quoted the (August 1789)
French Declaration of the Rights of Man that states that,
where there was no separation of powers, there could
be no constitution. Selçuk’s article was titled ‘From a
constitutional state to a state with a constitution’. The
problem he identified was that Turkish public opinion
was insufficiently alert to the possibility that, even with
general elections, virtues like democracy, secularism,
rights, freedom, the separation of powers, and judicial
independence could go by the board.18
Either way, the amendments will break a thread of legal
continuity between the Republic of the early twenty-
first century and the Republic founded by Atatürk and
his associates in 1923. Turkey’s experience of
democracy can be divided into what once seemed
three successive stages. The first saw the establishment
of parliamentary sovereignty and national
independence, when the 1921 and 1924 constitutions
were passed. The second saw a transition to
competitive elections and multi-party politics, between
1946 and 1950. Beginning in the 1980s, calls were
made for a further transition, to a more pluralist
democracy compatible with contemporary doctrines
of human rights. Until recently, it was felt that the first
two transitions were consolidated, if insufficient,
achievements. The failings of the system were
acknowledged; it was not thought that the
foundations themselves were fragile. Yet the problem
with talking about any constitutional or ideological
foundation is that it is always possible to slip another
one underneath it.
The cornerstone of this legal continuity was the idea of
national sovereignty expressed in a system of
parliamentary rule. For political theorist Taha Parla, the
first steps in the process of erosion came in 1961 and
1982, when constitutions were passed by parliaments
that gave themselves foundational powers, even
though they were products of states of exception
declared during two military coups.19 The more recent
proposals remain consistent with legal theorist Carl
Schmitt’s argument that effective government requires
a strong dictatorial approach that embraces
permanent crisis to free the executive from normal
legal restrictions. What will happen if the AKP’s
amendments are rejected, if later parliamentary
elections do not return an AKP majority (but Erdoğan is
elected president), or if Erdoğan himself were to retire
from his role? Faced with uncertain waters,
perspectives are necessarily historical. The move to a
presidential system will break a thread of parliamentary
continuity between the present and the past, which
had the advantage (if only for scholars) of enabling
observers to trace the constitutional origins of the
Republic to some Ottoman reform ideas of the late
nineteenth century.
If these proposals are backed by the Turkish public —
there will be an early general election if they are not —
policymakers will have to come to terms with a new
constitutional reality. One aspect of that reality — the
case while Ahmet Davutoğlu was prime minister — is
that external powers like the European Union will no
longer have a relatively emollient prime minister to
deal with, but the president. And the advantage of
seeing these reforms in the context of a decades-long
process of partisan entrenchment, is that outsiders will
have to recognize the sociological reality behind this
new system. That system may be partisan; it represents,
nonetheless, a predictable if undesirable outcome to
the unresolved contradiction of having competitive
elections, historically won by conservative or Islamic
parties, within a secular tutelary legal framework.
Were the European Union or countries like Great Britain
to have influence on the AKP — currently they are not
listened to — they could consider these proposals as a
potential source of regime instability. Thus far, no
constitutional framework has contained the potential
for polarization and violence in Turkish politics, and as
most political scientists, notably Juan Linz, believe, this
presidential form of majoritarianism is unlikely to be
different. The outcome of this particular regime change
could, in the long term, be regime breakdown. Less
obvious is the way a more personalized system of rule
will be tested by the economic performance of the AKP
in the future. Aside from its ability to play on historical
divisions within Turkey, its economic record has, on the
whole, been one of growth and dynamism. Yet, as
anthropologist Jenny White has argued, the AKP
project currently combines order, selective benefits,
and opportunities for its supporters.20 When the system
fails to make its ‘majority’ feel looked after, support for
the president may decline. And the economy has been
a source of anxiety recently.
For the European Union, there is a short- and long-term
calculus. Reliant as they are on Turkey for its acceptance
of a huge burden of Syrian migrants, the evidence is
that European leaders, from Merkel to May, are all too
aware of how dependent they are on Erdoğan right
now. If they liberalize the visa situation for Turks, future
migration may well come from many of those who will
be voting against the proposals on 16 April. The crisis
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will be resolved to the benefit of the AKP. In the long
term, if the European Union (or Britain) wants to
promote democracy in Turkey, the potential rests with
the younger generation, not with the political elite. The
policy of the current EU High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, is to
continue dealing with Turkey as an accession country,
despite her opposition to the arrest of the two HDP
leaders last November on the grounds that it
undermined parliamentary democracy. If, beyond this
referendum, there is stock-taking, the European Union
needs to consider whether democratization can be the
fruit of something other than the intergovernmental
project it has been engaged with for the past twenty
years. That engagement was based on an illusion; if
democratization once had potential in a different mode,
it can now only come from a non-governmental source. 
One wonders whether President Trump would admire
the force of Erdoğan’s constitutional populism, or
whether he still has a sneaking regard for the spirit of
the American constitution. Notably, none of his
broadsides against Muslims have been directed at
Turkey; this would in any case strengthen the AKP’s
popular support among the population. In the context
of the Middle East, Turkey has an alternative ally in
Russia, and its own geopolitical interests in Iraq and
Syria. One crucial test case for any new relationship
with the United States will be the Turkish demand that
Fetullah Gulen be extradited from his base in
Pennsylvania for his supposed role in the July coup
attempt. Other issues surround Cyprus, the Kurds, and
NATO. And one argument in favour of the current
changes is that Erdoğan will have a freer hand in
dealing with these issues than under a parliamentary
system. Turkey is not only a large state, under the AKP it
has become a regional player with a much greater
international presence than it had during the Cold War.
Given the strategic opportunities and pressures,
whatever the outcome in April, it is hard to see Erdoğan
being willing to give up the highly centralized decision-
making that has evolved up to now.
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